

THE GLOBAL RISE OF RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM

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Some months after the American military invasion of Iraq in 2003, I interviewed a Sunni Mullah in Baghdad who told me that both Saddam and America were enemies of Islam. The reason, he explained, was that both of them had attempted to impose secular nationalism on what he regarded as a religious culture, and this meant that both Saddam and the United States were Islam's foes. He felt that Iraq would not be truly free until it had established an Islamic nationalist state.

The mullah's views were not idiosyncratic to Iraq. Like Sikhs in India, Jewish extremists in Israel, and Christian militants in the United States, he thought of the secular state as something artificial. In the former Third World it was easy to tag the modern notion of secular nationalism as a colonial import of the West, for the concept frequently traveled as the excess baggage of a European or American presence. What is surprising is how potent the movements of religious nationalism have become in the developed countries, including Japan, Europe, and the United States. Though the division between church and state has ancient roots, religion in most Christian countries has played far from public life in the last three hundred years.

The idea of secular nationalism is a fairly recent invention. It appears as the ideological ally of a new idea—the nation-state—that appears in England and America in the eighteenth century. Prior to that time the administrative reach of the political center was so limited that rulers did not govern broadly in what might be called “the modern sense.”¹ Until the advent of the nation-state, the authority of a political center did not systematically and equally cover an entire population, so that what appeared to be a single homogeneous polity was in fact a congeries of fiefdoms.² The further one got from the center of power, the weaker the grip of centralized political influence, until at the periphery whole sections of a country might exist as a political no man's land. For that reason, one should speak of countries prior to the modern nation-state as having frontiers rather than boundaries.³

The changes of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries included the development of the technical ability to knit a country together through roads, rivers, and other means of transportation and communication; the construction of the economic ability to do so, through an increasingly integrated market structure; the emergence of a world economic system based on the building blocks of nation-states;⁴ the formation of mass education, which socialized each generation of youth into a homogeneous society; and the rise of parliamentary democracy as a system of representation and an expression of the will of the people. The glue that held all these changes together was a new form of nationalism: the notion that individuals naturally associate with the people and place of

their ancestral birth (or an adopted homeland such as the United States) in an economic and political system identified with a secular nation-state. Secular nationalism was thought to be not only natural but also universally applicable and morally right.

Although it was regarded almost as a natural law, secular nationalism was ultimately viewed as an expression of neither God nor nature but of the will of citizens.⁵ It was the political manifestation of the Enlightenment view of humankind. The ideas of John Locke about the origins of a civil community⁶ and the social-contract theories of Jean Jacques Rousseau required little commitment to religious belief.⁷ Although they allowed for a divine order that made the rights of humans possible, their ideas did not directly buttress the power of the Church and its priestly administrators, and they had the effect of taking religion—at least Church religion—out of public life.

The medieval Church once possessed “many aspects of a state,” as one historian put it, and it commanded more political power “than most of its secular rivals.”⁸ By the mid-nineteenth century, however, Christian churches had ceased to have much influence on European or American politics. The Church—the great medieval monument of Christendom with all its social and political panoply—had been replaced by churches: various denominations of Protestantism and a largely depoliticized version of Roman Catholicism. These churches functioned like religious clubs, voluntary associations for the spiritual edification of individuals in their leisure time, rarely cognizant of the social and political world around them.⁹

At the same time that religion in the West was becoming less political, its secular nationalism was becoming more religious. It became clothed in romantic and xenophobic images that would have startled its Enlightenment forebears. The French Revolution, the model for much of the nationalist fervor that developed in the nineteenth century, infused a religious zeal into revolutionary democracy; the revolution took on the trappings of church religion in the priestly power meted out to its demagogic leaders and in the slavish devotion to what it called the temple of reason. According to Alexis de Tocqueville, the French Revolution “assumed many of the aspects of a religious revolution.”¹⁰ The American Revolution also had a religious side: many of its leaders had been influenced by eighteenth-century deism, a religion of science and natural law that was “devoted to exposing [Church] religion to the light of knowledge.”¹¹ As in France, American nationalism developed its own religious characteristics, blending the ideals of secular nationalism and the symbols of Christianity into what has been called “civil religion.”

The nineteenth century saw the fulfillment of de Tocqueville’s prophecy that the “strange religion” of secular nationalism would, “like Islam, overrun the whole world with its apostles, militants, and martyrs.”¹² It was spread throughout the world with an almost missionary zeal and was shipped to the newly colonized areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as part of the ideological freight of colonialism. It became the ideological partner of what came to be known as nation building. As the colonizing governments provided their colonies with the political and economic infrastructures to turn territories into nation-states, the ideology of secular nationalism emerged as a by-product. As it had in the West in previous centuries, secular nationalism in the colonized countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries came to represent one side of a great encounter between two vastly different ways of perceiving the sociopolitical order and the relationship of the individual to the state: one informed by religion, the other by a notion of a secular compact.

In the West this encounter, and the ideological, economic, and political transitions that accompanied it, took place over many years. Though basic, these changes were not complicated by the intrusion of foreign control of a colonial or neocolonial sort. The new nations of this century have had to confront the same challenges in a short period of time and simultaneously contend with new forms of politics forced on them as by-products of colonial rule. As in the West, however, the challenge they have faced is fundamental: it involves the encounter between a religious world-view and one shaped by secular nationalism.

When Europeans colonized the rest of the world, they were often sustained by a desire to make the rest of the world like themselves.¹³ Even when empires became economically burdensome, the cultural mission seemed to justify the effort. The commitment of colonial administrators to a secular-nationalist vision explains why they were often so hostile to the Christian missionaries who tagged along behind them: the missionaries were the liberal colonizers' competitors. The Church's old religious ideology was a threat to the new secular ideology that most colonial rulers wished to present as characteristic of the West.¹⁴

In the mid-twentieth century, when the colonial powers retreated, they left behind the geographical boundaries they had drawn and the political institutions they had fashioned. Created as administrative units of the Ottoman, Hapsburg, French, and British empires, the borders of most Third World nations continued after independence, even if they failed to follow the natural divisions between ethnic and linguistic communities. By the middle of the twentieth century, it seemed as if the cultural goals of the colonial era had been reached: although the political ties were severed, the new nations retained all the accoutrements of Westernized countries.

The current situation is one in which the nation-state continues to be critical to world politics, not only for ideological reasons but also for economic ones: despite the growing power of transnational corporations, nation-states continue to be the essential units of the global economic system. In the past, religion had little role to play in this scheme, and when it did become involved, it often threatened it.¹⁵ Contemporary religious politics, then, is the result of an almost Hegelian dialectic between two competing frameworks of social order: secular nationalism (allied with the nation-state) and religion (allied with large ethnic communities). The clashes between them have often been destructive, but, as we shall see, they have also offered possibilities for accommodation. These encounters have given birth to a synthesis in which religion has in some cases become the ally of a new kind of nation-state.

Because the social functions of traditional religion and secular nationalism are so similar, it might be useful to designate a general category that includes them both: a "genus" of which religion and secular nationalism are the two competing "species." Benedict Anderson has suggested "imagined communities," and Ninian Smart has suggested "world-views" as the common term.¹⁶ Because our discussion is focused on conceptual frameworks that legitimize authority, however, we might consider a term with more political connotations, such as *ideologies of order*.

I use the word *ideology* with a certain amount of trepidation, knowing that it comes freighted with meanings attached to it by Karl Marx and Karl Mannheim, and a great deal of controversy still lingers over its interpretation today.¹⁷ The term is useful for our purposes, however, because it originated in the late eighteenth century in the context

of the rise of secular nationalism.¹⁸ A group of French *idéologues*, as they called themselves, were attempting to build a science of ideas based on the theories of Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and René Descartes that would be sufficiently comprehensive to replace religion. According to one of the *idéologues*, Destutt de Tracy, whose book *Elements of Ideology* introduced the term to the world, “logic” was to be the sole basis of “the moral and political sciences.”¹⁹ The French originators of the term would be surprised at the way it has come to be redefined, especially in contemporary conversations where it is often designated as an explanatory system that is specifically “nonscientific.”²⁰ But in proposing their own “science of ideas” as a replacement for religion, the *idéologues* were in fact putting what they called ideology and what we call religion on an equal plane. Perhaps Clifford Geertz, among modern users of the term, has come closest to its original meaning by speaking of ideology as a “cultural system.”²¹

Both religious and secular-nationalistic frameworks of thought conceive of the world in coherent, manageable ways; they both suggest that there are levels of meaning beneath the day-to-day world that give coherence to things unseen; and they both provide the authority that gives the social and political order its reason for being. In doing so they define for the individual the right way of being in the world and relate persons to the social whole. Secular nationalism, as an ideology of order, locates an individual within the universe. It ties him or her to a larger collectivity associated with a particular place and a particular history, a point made by a number of social theorists. Karl Deutsch has pointed out the importance of systems of communication in fostering a sense of nationalism.²² Ernest Gellner argues that the political and economic network of a nation-state can function only in a spirit of nationalism based on a homogeneous culture, a unified pattern of communication, and a common system of education.²³ Other social scientists have stressed the psychological aspect of national identity: the sense of historical location that is engendered when individuals feel they have a larger, national history.²⁴

But behind these notions of community is the image of moral order. Nationalism involves loyalty to an authority who, as Max Weber observed, holds a monopoly over the “legitimate use of physical force” in a given society.²⁵ Anthony Giddens describes nationalism as the “cultural sensibility of sovereignty,” implying that, in part, the awareness of being subject to an authority—an authority invested with the power of life and death—gives nationalism its potency.²⁶ Secular nationalism, therefore, involves not only an attachment to a spirit of social order but also an act of submission to an ordering agent.

Scholarly attempts to define religion also stress the importance of order, albeit in a conceptual as well as in a political and social sense.²⁷ In providing its adherents with a sense of conceptual order, religion often deals with the fundamental problem of disorder. The disorderliness of ordinary life is contrasted with a substantial, unchanging divine order.²⁸ Geertz sees religion as the effort to integrate messy everyday reality into a pattern of coherence at a deeper level.²⁹ Robert Bellah also thinks of religion as an attempt to reach beyond ordinary phenomena in a “risk of faith” that allows people to act “in the face of uncertainty and unpredictability” on the basis of a higher order of reality.³⁰ This attitude of faith, according to Peter Berger, is an affirmation of the sacred, which acts as a doorway to a truth more certain than that of this world.³¹ Louis Dupré prefers to avoid the term *sacred* but integrates elements of both Berger’s and Bellah’s definitions in

his description of religion as “a commitment to the transcendent as to *another* reality.”³² In all these cases there is a tension between this imperfect, disorderly world, and a perfected, orderly one to be found in a higher, transcendent state or in a cumulative moment in time. As Emile Durkheim, whose thought is fundamental to each of these thinkers, was adamant in observing, religion has a more encompassing force than can be suggested by any dichotomization of the sacred and the profane. To Durkheim, the religious point of view includes both the notion that there is such a dichotomy and the belief that the sacred side will always, ultimately, reign supreme.³³

From this perspective, religion, like secular nationalism, is the glue that holds together broad communities.³⁴ Members of these communities—secular or religious—share a tradition, a particular world-view, in which the essential conflict between appearance and deeper reality is described in specific and characteristically cultural terms. This deeper reality has a degree of permanence and order quite unobtainable by ordinary means. The conflict between the two levels of reality is what both religion and secular nationalism are about: the language of both contains images of grave disorder as well as tranquil order, holding out the hope that, despite appearances to the contrary, order will eventually triumph and disorder will be contained.

Because both religion and secular nationalism are ideologies of order, they are potential rivals. Either can claim to be the guarantor of orderliness within a society; either can claim to be the ultimate authority for social order. Such claims carry with them an extraordinary degree of power, for contained within them is the right to give moral sanction for life and death decisions, including the right to kill. When either secular nationalism or religion assumes that role by itself, it reduces the other to a peripheral social role.

Earlier in history it was often religion that denied moral authority to secular politicians, but in recent centuries it has been the other way around. Political authorities now attempt to monopolize the authority to sanction violence. They made this attempt long before the advent of the nation-state but usually in collusion with religious authority, not in defiance of it. Seldom in history has the state denied so vehemently the right of religious authorities to be ultimate moral arbiters as in the modern period, and seldom before has it so emphatically taken on that role itself. The state, and the state alone, is given the power to kill legitimately, albeit for limited purposes: military defense, police protection, and capital punishment. Yet all the rest of the state’s power to persuade and to shape the social order is derived from this fundamental power. In Weber’s view, the monopoly over legitimate violence in a society is the very definition of a state.³⁵ In challenging the state’s authority today’s religious activists, wherever they assert themselves around the world, reclaim the traditional right of religious authorities to say when violence is moral and when it is not.

Religious conflict is one indication of the power of religion to sanction killing. The parties in such an encounter may command a greater degree of loyalty than do contestants in a purely political war. Their interests can subsume national interests. In some cases such a religious battle may preface the attempt to establish a new religious state. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the best-known incidents of religious violence throughout the contemporary world have occurred in places where it is difficult to define or accept the idea of a nation-state. At the end of the twentieth century these places included Palestine, the Punjab, and Sri Lanka; in the twenty-first century they

include Iraq, Somalia, and Lebanon, areas where uncertainties abound about what the state should be, and what elements of society should lead it. In these instances, religion has often provided the basis for a new national consensus and a new kind of leadership.

Islam, Judaism and Christianity have provided religious alternatives to secular ideology as the basis of nationalism. So also has Hinduism, Sikhism and perhaps most surprisingly, Buddhism. In Thailand, for example, the king must be a monk before assuming political power—he must be a “world renouncer” before he can become a “world conqueror,” as Stanley Tambiah has put it.³⁶ Burmese leaders established a Buddhist socialism, guided by a curious syncretic mix of Marxist and Buddhist ideas, and even the revolution against that order in Burma—renamed Myanmar—had a religious character: many of the demonstrations in the streets were led by Buddhist monks.³⁷ Thus, in most traditional religious societies, including Buddhist ones, “religion,” as Donald Smith puts it, “answers the question of political legitimacy.”³⁸ In the modern West that legitimacy is provided by nationalism, a secular nationalism. But even there, religion continues to wait in the wings, a potential challenge to the nationalism based on secular assumptions. Perhaps nothing indicates this potential more than the persistence of religious politics in American society, including the rise of the Christian militia and the American religious right.³⁹ Religion, like secular nationalism, provides a faith in the unitary nature of a society that authenticates both political rebellion and political rule.

How Secular Nationalism Failed to Accommodate Religion

In places like the United States and Europe, where secular nationalism, rather than religion, has become the dominant paradigm in society, religion has been shunted to the periphery. This transposition is most dramatically illustrated by the clublike church religion that is common in the United States. Yet, even there, attempts have been made to assimilate some aspects of religion into the national consensus. The reasons for doing so are varied: coopting elements of religion into nationalism keeps religion from building its own antinational power base; it provides religious legitimacy for the state; and it helps to give nationalism a religious aura. To accomplish these goals, national leaders have borrowed various elements of a society’s religious culture. The secular nationalism of the United States is to some extent colored by a religiosity such as this, as Bellah has pointed out in his analysis of the “civil religion” sprinkled throughout the inaugural addresses of American presidents and the rhetoric of other public speakers.⁴⁰

Despite these attempts to coopt it, and despite its relegation to the periphery of society, church religion occasionally intrudes into the political sphere. In what Jaroslav Krejci calls “the American pattern” of society—the attempt to blend “ethnopolitical relationships” into a homogeneous whole—some religious groups resist the blending.⁴¹ This resistance was seen dramatically during the civil-rights movement, when the African American church and its clergy became central political actors, and religious movements such as the Black Muslims arose as vehicles of protest. In a different way the ascendance of Protestant politicians is a new assault on the presumptions of secular nationalism in the United States. Secular nationalism in Europe is also not completely immune from religion. In what Krejci calls “the European pattern,” where strong ethnic and religious communities are supposedly insulated from political life, the insulation sometimes wears thin.⁴² The events in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s are cases in point.

So the West has found that religion does not always stay tightly leashed. But if accommodating religion has been difficult for the West, efforts to bridle religion in the new nations have been a thousand times more problematic. There the need to deal with religion is much more obvious. Given religious histories that are part of national heritages, religious institutions that are sometimes the nations' most effective systems of communication, and religious leaders who are often more devoted, efficient, and intelligent than government officials, religion cannot be ignored. The attempts to accommodate it, however, have not always been successful, as the following examples indicate.

In Egypt, following the revolution of 1952, Nasser was caught in a double bind. Because his support came from both the Muslim Brotherhood and the modern elite, he was expected to create a Muslim state and a modern secular state at the same time. His approach was to paint a picture of an Egypt that was culturally Muslim and politically secular, and he cheerfully went about "Egyptizing along with modernizing," as a professor in Cairo put it.⁴³ The compromise did not work, and especially after Nasser attempted to institute "scientific socialism," which the Muslim Brotherhood regarded as anti-Islamic, the Brotherhood became Nasser's foe. It attempted to overthrow his government, and Nasser jailed its members and executed its leader, Sayyid Qutb.

Nasser's successor, Anwar al-Sadat, repeated the pattern, which turned out to be a tragic and fatal mistake. Like Nasser, Sadat raised Muslim expectations by currying favor with the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1971, he released many of them from jail. But by 1974 he and the Brotherhood were at loggerheads, and again the organization was outlawed. Sadat attempted to wear the mantle of Islam by calling himself "Upholder of the Faith," announcing that his first name was really Muhammad rather than Anwar, and promoting religious schools. None of these attempts worked. His wife was thought to be an improper role model for Muslim women, and Sadat himself was accused of being a Muslim turncoat. With this image in mind, members of the al-Jihad, a radical fringe group of the Muslim Brotherhood, assassinated Sadat in 1981. His successor, Hosni Mubarak, tried to steer more of a middle course, making no promises to the Muslim activists, but making no new secular or socialist departures either.⁴⁴

In India, three generations of Prime Ministers in the Nehru dynasty—Jawaharlal, his daughter Indira Gandhi, and her son Rajiv—all tried to accommodate religion as little as possible. Yet at times they were forced to make concessions to religious groups almost against their wills. Nehru seemed virtually allergic to religion, putting secularism alongside socialism as his great political goal. Nonetheless the Indian constitution and subsequent parliamentary actions have given a great deal of public support to religious entities.⁴⁵ Special seats have been reserved in the legislature for Muslims and members of other minority religious communities; religious schools have been affiliated with the state; and temples and mosques have received direct public support. In general the Indian government has not been indifferent to religion but has attempted to treat—and foster—each religion in the country equally. As Ainslie Embree puts it, "Advocates of secularism in India always insisted . . . that far from being hostile to religion, they valued it."⁴⁶

Even so, these concessions have not been sufficient to stem the tide of religious politics in India. The 1980s was a decade of tragedy in that regard. Hindu nationalists wanted more and more access to power, prompting defensiveness on the part of Muslim and Christian minorities and a bloody rebellion on the part of the Sikhs. The

assassinations of Prime Minister Gandhi and her son Rajiv did not put an end to their sense of dissatisfaction, and the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party displaced the Congress party in providing national leadership from 1998 to 2004, when it was defeated by a revived Congress Party led by Rajiv Gandhi's widow, Sonia, who stepped aside to allow an economist, Manmohan Singh, to become Prime Minister.

Comment [BL1]: Citation??

These attempts to accommodate religion in secular nationalism lead to a double frustration: those who make these compromises are sometimes considered traitors from both a spiritual and a secular point of view. Moreover, these compromises imply that spiritual and political matters are separate—an idea that most religious activists reject, and see as a capitulation to secularism. They sense that behind the compromises is a basic allegiance to secular nationalism rather than to religion.

Can Religion Accommodate the Nation-State?

So secular nationalism does not easily accommodate religion. On the other hand, religion can sometimes be hospitable to the idea of the nation-state—though on religion's terms. Religious activists are well aware that if a nation is based from the start on the premise of secular nationalism, religion is often made marginal to the political order. This outcome is especially unfortunate from many radical religious perspectives—including Jihadi militants, messianic Jewish Zionists, and Christian militia—because they regard the two ideologies as unequal: the religious one is far superior. Rather than starting with secular nationalism, they prefer to begin with religion.

According to one Sinhalese writer, whose booklet, *The Revolt in the Temple*, was published shortly after Sri Lankan independence and was influential in spurring on the Buddhist national cause, “it is clear that the unifying, healing, progressive principle” that held together the entity known as Ceylon throughout the years has always been “the Buddhist faith.”⁴⁷ The writer goes on to say that religion in Sri Lanka continues to provide the basis for a “liberating nationalism” and that Sinhalese Buddhism is “the only patriotism worthy of the name, worth fighting for or dying for.”⁴⁸ In India, Hindu nationalists have been equally emphatic that Hindutva, as they call Hindu national culture, is the defining characteristic of Indian nationalism. Similar sentiments are echoed in movements of religious nationalism elsewhere in the world.

The implication of this way of speaking is not that religion is not necessarily antithetical to nationalism, but that religious rather than secular nationalism is the appropriate premise on which to build a nation—even a modern nation-state. In fact, virtually every reference to nationhood used by religious activists assumes that the modern nation-state is the only way in which a nation can be construed. The term *religious nationalism*, therefore, means the attempt to link religion and the nation-state. This is a new development in the history of nationalism, and it immediately raises the question of whether it is possible: whether what we in the West think of as a modern nation—a unified, democratically controlled system of economic and political administration—can in fact be accommodated within religion.

It is an interesting question and one to which many Western observers would automatically answer no. Even as acute an interpreter of modern society as Giddens regards most religious cultures as, at best, a syncretism of “tribal cultures, on the one hand, and modern societies, on the other.”⁴⁹ Yet by Giddens's own definition of a modern nation-state, postrevolutionary Iran would qualify. The Islamic revolution in Iran

solidified not just central power but also systemic control, a dominance over the population that in some ways was more conducive to nationhood than the monarchical political order of the shah. The Iranian case will be explored later in this book, but suffice it to say here that at least in this intense a new national entity came into being that was quite different from previous kinds of Muslim rule and the secular regime that the shah ineptly attempted to build. The shah dreamed of creating Kemal Ataturk's Turkey in Iran and bringing to his country the instant modernity that he perceived Ataturk brought to Turkey. Ironically, it was Khomeini—with his integrative religious ideology and his grass-roots network of mullahs—who brought Iran closer to the goal of a unified nation.

Does religion lose some essential aspects in accommodating modern politics? Some religious leaders think that it does. In favoring the nation-state over a particular religious congregation as its major community of reference, religion loses the exclusivity held by smaller, subnational religious communities, and the leaders of those communities lose some of their autonomy. For that reason, many religious leaders are suspicious of religious nationalism. Among them are religious Utopians who would rather build their own isolated political societies than deal with the problems of a whole nation, religious liberals who are satisfied with the secular nation-state the way it is, and religious conservatives who would rather ignore politics altogether. Some Muslims accused Khomeini of making Islam into a political ideology and reducing it to a modern political force.⁵⁰ Moreover, as Lewis claims, most Islamic rebellions are aimed in the opposite direction: to shed Islam of the alien idea of the nation-state.⁵¹ Yet, even if that is their aim, one of the curious consequences of their way of thinking is the appropriation of many of the most salient elements of modern nationhood into an Islamic frame of reference. Rather than ridding Islam of the nation-state, they too are creating a new synthesis.

Perhaps the most brazen of the new religious activists are those who move beyond the nation-state to think in transnational terms. The Aum Shinrikyo movement in Japan, for example, imagined a global apocalypse in which their own movement's leaders would survive to become the rulers of a unified post-war world. The radical jihadi movement associated with Osama bin Laden also has had a transnational agenda. Though the movement targeted what it regarded as corrupt governments—including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, the United States, and many European countries—the diverse network of activists associated with the jihadi cause have come from a variety of national backgrounds. Its organizations have defied national boundaries. Moreover, for all of its carefully orchestrated violence against what it regarded as evil powers—including the spectacular destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the subsequent attacks on the transportation systems of London and Madrid, and the many bombings in Iraq—no clear plans for alternative governments or politics have emerged. Rather, the rhetoric of bin Laden and his associates, including Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zaqarwi, have referred only obliquely to some sort of transnational Islamic polity that might be erected in the future. They have been clear, however, about what they do not want: a secular nation-state. From this point of view, even religiously defined nation-states are insufficient, and religious regimes such as Afghanistan's Taliban are welcomed only because they are stepping-stones towards some inchoate vision of a broader Islamic political entity. What made the Taliban so useful, from their perspective, was the safe haven it provided for leaders in the transnational Islamic struggle.

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Modern movements of religious activism, therefore, are subjects of controversy within both religious and secular circles. The marriage between those old competing ideologies of order—religion and secular nationalism—has produced the mutant offspring of contemporary religious politics. This is an interesting turn in modern history, and one fraught with dangers, for the radical accommodation of religion to the ideologies of nationalism and transnationalism may not be good for either religion or political order. The rebellious religious movements that emerged in many parts of the world in the late 20th and early 21st centuries have exhibited both the dangers and the possibilities inherent in religious activists' appropriation of the instruments of political power, including global networks and the enduring notion of the nation-state.